“Trustworthy elections cannot be assured as long as the machines themselves are untrustworthy,” said the organization in a Jan. 6 letter to Secretary of State Brad Johnson.
The flaws came to light in a two-year, $1.9 million study released last month in Ohio. The matter arose Monday during a Missoula League of Women Voters meeting.
Ohio's secretary of state conducted the study to improve the integrity of that state's elections. The study included an analysis of machines and software built by Election Systems and Software, which Montana uses. The report concluded that the ES&S voting system failed security checks and failed to meet best practices requirements.
The league responded by urging Johnson to decertify all such machines until they could be updated: “As you know, Montana law (MCA 13-17-103(2)) requires that state-approved voting systems ... ‘be based on commonly accepted industry standards for readily available technologies.' The EVEREST report reveals that ES&S machines used in Montana are not.”
EVEREST stands for Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment Standards and Testing.
Montana uses ES&S products because the company makes machines that count paper ballots, which Montana uses, said Bowen Greenwood, a spokesman in the secretary of state's office.
Missoula County uses anywhere from 50 to 70 precinct counters, two central counters and some 39 AutoMARK machines, which people with disabilities can use to mark ballots. The system cost around $600,000.
Zeier said safeguards are in place to protect the integrity of elections and Missoula intends to add even more security checks this year. A poll book, a true record of how many people voted, is reconciled with the machine count when votes are canvassed.
And she said vigilant workers at polling places keep close tabs on a machine tally of ballots cast. That means any attempt to zero out a machine would not go unnoticed. She said the idea to update software raised a dilemma. She said she believes even new antivirus software must first be certified by the state before being loaded into a machine.
The federal government is on the brink of adopting new guidelines for certifying software, but hasn't yet. And the old ones are from 2002.
Decertifying the machines would mean counting votes by hand - and Zeier said that would leave candidates and the public waiting days for results. The idea of a hand count, however, didn't distress at least one league leader.
“I've counted lots of ballots,” said Missoula League of Women Voters president Gladys Hardin.
She said elections in Missoula County are probably the most secure in the state because of Zeier's care. But Hardin does not trust the machines themselves.
Greenwood said no machine will ever perfectly meet all security standards, but elections can still be safe. Every weakness identified in the study requires physical access to the machines, Greenwood said. That means proper safeguards and procedures can prevent tampering. Plus, he said Montana has a good backup system.
“We use paper ballots, which means that even in the worst-possible-case scenario - if every machine in Montana were hacked and taken over - we would still have an accurate count of the votes,” Greenwood said.
Greenwood also said the best practices used in the report were from the banking industry, so the machines actually weren't tested against best practices for elections.
The secretary of state is drafting a detailed response to the League of Women Voters' letter, he said. If enough evidence arises that the machines cannot be secured, the state would stop using them. But Bowen said that standard has not been met.
He also said putting the machines out of commission would have severe results for the 2008 election: “It is not possible to conduct a modern election without machines - not if you want the results before January.”
|
 |
 |
Add your comment now! Write your comment in the form below.
(Email address is for verification only. If you'd like to email a story, look for the link above)